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ABSTRACT
In many collective decisionmaking situations, agents vote to choose
an alternative that best represents the preferences of the group.
Agents may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by
voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In real
world voting scenarios, people often do not have complete informa-
tion about other voter preferences and it can be computationally
complex to identify a strategy that will maximize their expected
utility. In such situations, it is often assumed that voters will vote
truthfully rather than expending the effort to strategize. However,
being truthful is just one possible heuristic that may be used. In this
paper, we examine the effectiveness of heuristics in single winner
and multi-winner approval voting scenarios with missing votes. In
particular, we look at heuristics where a voter ignores information
about other voting profiles and makes their decisions based solely
on how much they like each candidate. In a behavioral experiment,
we show that people vote truthfully in some situations and pri-
oritize high utility candidates in others. We examine when these
behaviors maximize expected utility and show how the structure
of the voting environment affects both how well each heuristic
performs and how humans employ these heuristics.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Computational Social Choice (COMSOC) investigates computa-
tional issues surrounding the aggregation of individual preferences
and collective decision making [7]. Much of this work has focused
on the computational complexity of manipulating elections under
different voting rules. When it is computationally prohibitive to
manipulate an election, it is assumed that voters will vote with their
true preferences rather than trying to strategize [11].
Voting truthfully is just one possible heuristic that voters may
use when faced with complex voting scenarios. A recent study of
voting behavior in multi-winner approval elections showed that the
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majority of voters did not vote truthfully or optimally [31]. Instead,
the predominant strategy was to use a take the X best heuristic
which prioritized the highest utility candidates. Another study
showed that in a plurality election where a preferred candidate was
dominated, voters would compromise and vote for the leader [33].
The effectiveness of a particular heuristic depends on the envi-
ronment in which it is being used. Decision science research has
examined heuristic decision making in complex and uncertain situ-
ations. Sometimes, heuristics are viewed as second best shortcuts,
when the environment is too complex to use rational strategies [34].
However, researchers have also shown that heuristics are adaptive
strategies that work in the real world, leveraging natural cogni-
tive abilities that exploit the structure of the environment, often
leading to better outcomes with the use of less information. Key to
this view of heuristics is that in uncertain environments, decision
strategies that ignore some information can sometimes achieve
better performance than more complicated optimization strategies
in situations that are computationally complex or uncertain [14],
e.g., stock market predictions [8].
This paper examines the effectiveness of heuristics in single win-
ner and multi-winner approval voting elections with uncertainty.
Specifically, voters are presented with scenarios where there are
missing votes, contrary to the standard COMSOC assumption of
complete information for strategic agents [7]. In approval voting, an
agent may vote for as many candidates as they wish. Winners are
chosen by tallying up the votes and choosing the top-k candidates
receiving the most votes. Under the basic approval voting rule, an
optimal manipulation can be computed in polynomial time when an
agent has complete information about the preferences of all the vot-
ers [26]. However, it has been shown that when information about
voting preferences is missing, computing the possible winners or
manipulating the vote is computationally complex [36]. Although
manipulation may be computationally hard, voting truthfully or
using other heuristics may still maximize a voters expected utility.
1.1 Contribution
We show how specific underlying features of voting environments
affect how well different heuristics perform compared to maximiz-
ing expected utility. In particular, we look at heuristic strategies
including truthful, take the X best, and regret minimization in sce-
narios where less preferred, neutral and disliked candidates lead in
an election. In our context, using a truthful strategy means voting
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for all candidates with positive utility. Voting for the highest utility
candidate is an example of the take the X best heuristic, with X = 1.
Regret minimization refers to voting for all liked and neutral candi-
dates to reduce the chance that a disliked candidate, represented by
negative utility, will win the election. In a behavioral experiment
of 104 subjects on Mechanical Turk, we show how the number
of winners, the current leader(s) and the number of missing votes
affect the heuristic strategies that people use in approval voting. We
find that in many situations most subjects do not vote completely
truthfully or maximize their expected utility. Our work provides key
insights on human behavior in voting environments. This can lead
to more realistic simulation tools and more accurate predictions
of election outcomes when approval voting is used. Our study can
also inform the design of automated decision support systems by
providing evidence about which heuristics humans may be inclined
to use in different contexts and help in designing suggestions which
take these behavioral aspects into account. Heuristics adopted by
humans can also inspire the design of fast and frugal algorithms
for tackling problems of prohibitive size or complexity.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We give a brief overview of the mathematical formalism used to
study approval voting and formally define the heuristics that we
will consider in this paper.
2.1 Approval Voting
Following Aziz et al. [1] and Kilgour [16] we consider a social choice
setting (N ,C) where we are given a set N = {1, . . . ,n} of voting
agents and a disjoint setC = {c1, . . . , cm } of candidates. Each agent
i ∈ N expresses an approval ballot Ai ⊆ C which gives rise to a set
of approval ballots A = {A1, . . . ,An }, called a profile. We study the
multi-winner approval voting rule that take as input an instance
(A,C,k) and return a subset of candidatesW ⊆ C where |W | = k
called the winning set.
Approval Voting (AV) finds the setW ⊆ C where |W | = k that
maximizes the total weight of approvals (approval score),AV (W ) =∑
i ∈N |W ∩Ai |. Informally, the winning set under AV is the set of
candidates that are approved by the largest number of voters.
In some cases it is necessary to use a tie-breaking rule in addition
to a voting rule in order to enforce that the size ofW is indeed k .
Tie-breaking is an important topic in COMSOC and can have sig-
nificant effects on the complexity of manipulation of various rules
even under idealized models [2, 20, 28]. Typical in the literature a
lexicographic tie-breaking rule is given as a fixed ordering over C
and the winners are selected in this order. However, in this paper,
as discussed in Aziz et al. [2], we break ties by selecting the winner
randomly to more closely simulate a real world election.
In order to align our work with the literature on decision heuris-
tics [13] we assume that each agent i ∈ N also has a real val-
ued utility function ui : C → R. We also assume that the utility
of agent i for a particular set of winning candidatesW ⊂ C is
ui (W ) = ∑c ∈W ui (c) (slightly abusing notation). IfW is the subset
elected by the voting rule we will refer toui (W ) as agent’s i’s utility
for the outcome of the election.
2.2 Truthfulness and Sincerity in Approval
Ballots
The literature on approval voting for multi-winner elections goes
back at least nearly 40 years to the work of Brams [3]. For nearly
that entire period there has been intense discussion of the strategic
aspects of approval balloting [4]. Researchers over the years have
made a variety of assumptions and (re)definitions of what makes a
particular vote either truthful or strategic. Much of this commentary
is captured in introductory chapter to the Handbook of Approval
voting [17]. As detailed in Laslier and Sanver [17], Niemi [27] quotes
the following definition of Sincere Approval Voting from Brams [4]:
“A voter votes sincerely if and only if whenever he votes for some
candidate, he votes for all candidates preferred to that candidate”
and writes “Note that this definition includes nothing about ap-
proval as such; it does not require voting only for âĂŸapprovedâĂŹ
alternatives.” Niemi even writes, “the existence of multiple sincere
strategies almost begs the voter to behave strategically.” [27].
Within the COMSOC community this issue has arisen a number
of times: what does it mean to be sincere and/or truthful in a given
situation? This is nicely expressed by Endriss [9], “In approval
voting, a ballot consists of the names of any subset of the set of
candidates standing; these are the candidates the voter approves
of. The candidate receiving the most approvals wins. A ballot is
considered sincere if the voter prefers any of the approved candi-
dates over any of the disapproved candidates. Hence, there will be
multiple sincere ballots for any given preference ordering.”
However, this does rest on an assumption about the underlying
preference model, as discussed by Meir et al. [26], when agents
are only endowed with binary utilities, a truthful vote is always a
strategic vote [25, 26], i.e., approval voting is incentive compatible.
A strategic vote is one in which an agent maximizes their total
(expected) utility given a particular decision setting. However, as
Meir et al. [26] continues, “manipulation in Approval is a subtle
issue, since the issuemay be ill-definedwhen the voters are assumed
to have linear preferences over the candidates. In this case, there
are multiple sincere ballots (where all approved candidates are
preferred to all disapproved candidates).”
Given this discussion we make the following distinctions:
(1) In the presence of additive utilities and multiple winners we
assume that a completely truthful vote is one where the voter
approves all candidates for which they have positive utility.
(2) A sincere vote, which includes the definitions of Endriss [9],
Meir et al. [26], and Brams [4], is one in which if a voter
prefers a particular candidate, then he approves all candi-
dates that are preferred to that particular candidates. In-
tuitively, this is an assumption of monotonicity over the
preferences and captures many of the votes one would cast
in the take the X best hueristic discussed in the following.
We argue, and will use, the terminology that any vote that is not
completely truthful by our definition is considered strategic. While
it is the case that these votes may be sincere, we argue they are not
completely truthful as, given the definitions above, it is strategically
leaving some information out. In what follows we consider, as does
much of the literature, the question of which strategic vote to use,
and what internal heuristics one may be using to decide it.
2
2.3 Heuristic Decision Models
Heuristics are strategies, or adaptive shortcuts, that humans use
to make decisions. This originated with the idea of bounded ra-
tionality [32], or the observation that both the human mind and
the environment make application of normative decision models
impossible. Heuristics have been studied in depth in a number of
fields, see Hilbig [15] for an overview. Though sometimes seen as
second best alternatives when maximization is not possible, other
research views heuristics as ideally adapted strategies that capital-
ize on the structure of the environment to provide solutions when
optimization is not an option, e.g. NP-hard problems, ill defined
problems, or unfamiliar/time sensitive problems. In many situa-
tions, heuristics have been shown to outperform solutions that use
more complex algorithms (i.e. stock market predictions [8]).
Key to this idea of heuristics is that they are fast, composed
typically of three steps: search, stop, and apply decision rules. They
are also frugal, ignoring some of the casually relevant information.
Proponents of fast and frugal heuristics have promoted the idea of
ecological rationality which examines the rationality of a decision
strategy in its environment [19]. For example, if a simple heuristic
that ignores some causally relevant information provides the best
solution in a specific environment (i.e. using regret minimization
when a disliked candidate leads the election) it is considered eco-
logically rational, despite violating axioms of normative theories
(such as expected utility theory).
We present three such heuristics inspired from the literature
that we believed a priori could be used in single winner and multi-
winner approval voting. These include truthful, take the X best, and
regret minimization. Each of these strategies ignore information (i.e.
the total votes so far) and use only the utility of each candidate to
decide who to vote for.
2.3.1 Truthful. We define a truthful vote as one where an agent
approves of all candidates for which they have positive utility. This
corresponds to the notion of completely truthful above.
2.3.2 Take the X Best. When an agent votes with the take the
X best heuristic, they vote for a subset of the truthful vote. First,
they order the list of candidates by the utility value. Formally, T =
t1 > ... > tx where u1(t1) > ... > uX (tX ). The agent will then vote
for the top-X candidates in the list. X could be calculated using a
magnitude cut off or a proportional difference between preferences
[6]. We do not use specific rule to choose X , opting instead to test
all sizes of X . In this paper, we examine situations where there
candidates’ utility values are not tied, so no tie-breaking rule is
assumed. In the future, it would be interesting to explore if and
how voters choose between candidates with equal utility.
2.3.3 Regret Minimization. Regret minimization takes into ac-
count the voter’s anticipated regret if a particular disliked candidate
were to win the election. Rather than try maximize their utility, the
voter may choose to minimize the chance that the disliked candi-
date(s) will win by voting for all other candidates, whether they
generate positive utility or not [37, 38].
3 RELATEDWORK
Approval voting is a set of methods for aggregating group pref-
erences that is particularly popular among economists, computer
scientists, psychologists, and beyond [5, 17]. There are even mul-
tiple political action committees (PACs) in the United States, e.g.,
The Center for Election Science1, that are committed to seeing the
United States change voting procedures to approval voting. One
reason for this popularity is the idea that participants are allowed
to express preference over a set of candidates and not just a single
one. In France, a large study was run parallel to the 2002 election
showing that many voters would have preferred approval ballots
to traditional plurality ballots [18].
The complexity of manipulation for various types of approval
voting (AV) has received considerable attention in the COMSOC
literature [7]. Assuming that agents act rationally and have full
information about the votes of other agents, when agents have
Boolean utilities, i.e., when all agents either have utility 1 or 0
for candidates they approve or disapprove of, respectively, AV is
strategy-proof. When agents have general utilities, finding a vote
that maximizes the agent’s utilities can be computed in polynomial
time [25, 26]. For variants of AV including Proportional Approval
Voting, Satisfaction Approval Voting, and the Repeated Approval
Voting, the complexity of finding utility maximizing votes ranges
in complexity from easy to coNP-complete [1].
Many theoretical works in COMSOC make worst case computa-
tional assumptions: manipulators have complete information, all
votes are known, etc. However, there also are several efforts to
expand these worst case assumptions and strategic issues to in-
clude the presence of uncertain information or when agents are not
perfectly rational. In Reijngoud and Endriss [30], agents are given
access to poll information and agent behaviors are modeled as be-
ing k-pragmatist, i.e., they only look at the top k candidates when
deciding whether or not to make a strategic decision. In Meir et al.
[24], agents are modeled as behaving in locally dominant ways, i.e.,
they take into account only a small number of possible outcomes
when deciding whether or not to act strategically in a particular
voting setting. A survey of other recent work on issues surrounding
strategic voting is given by Meir [23].
There is a growing effort to use simulations and real-world data
to test various decision making models, e.g., [21, 22]. Within the
economics and psychology literature there have been several studies
of approval voting and the behavior of voters. Perhaps the most
interesting and relevant to our work is the studies of Regenwetter
et al. [29] which focus on elections of various professional societies
where approval balloting was used and the work of Zou et al. [39]
where many approval voting settings were obtained from Doodle,
an online polling platform. In Regenwetter et al. [29] election data is
used along with proposed heuristics for individual choice behavior,
the conclusion is that many voters use a plurality heuristic when
voting in AV elections, i.e., they vote as if they are in a plurality
election, selecting only their most preferred candidate. In both of
these works only AV with a single winner was investigated and
both works relied on real-world elections where it was not possible
to tease out the relationships between environment and decision.
To our knowledge, the work presented in this paper is the first that
examines human voting behavior in multi-winner approval settings.
We also build upon this work by introducing a new behavioral
experiment that examines how voters select different strategies,
1https://www.electionscience.org/
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depending on the underlying environmental factors (i.e. number of
winners and number of missing votes).
Three recent papers address strategic voting under the plurality
rule where agents are making decisions in uncertain environments.
First, Tyszler and Schram [35] study the voting behavior of agents
under the plurality rule with three options. They find that the
amount of information available to the voters affects the decision
on whether or not to vote strategically and that in many cases
the strategic decisions do not affect the outcome of the plurality
vote. Second, in Tal et al. [33] an online system is presented where
participants vote for cash payments in a number of settings using
the plurality rule under uncertainty. Two specific scenarios are
studied: one where a user votes after being given access to a large
pre-election poll and the second where agents vote simultaneously
and can update their votes. They find that most participants do not
engage in strategic voting unless there is a clear way to benefit.
In the iterative setting most voters were lazy and if they did vote
strategically, they would do a one step look ahead or perform a
best response myopically. Finally, in Fairstein et al. [10] a compre-
hensive study using both past datasets and newly collected ones
examines the actual behavior of agents in multiple settings with
uncertainty versus behavior that is predicted by a number of be-
havioral and heuristic models. The paper proposes a novel model
of user voting behavior in these uncertain settings called attainable
utility, where agents consider how much utility they would gain
versus the likelihood of particular agents winning given an uncer-
tain poll. They conclude that the attainable utility model is able to
explain the behavior seen in the experimental studies better than
existing models and even perform near the level of state of the art
machine learning algorithms in modeling users’ actual behavior.
We expand upon this work on plurality to consider heuristics in
approval voting environments with uncertainty, showing that it
may be ecologically rational for voters to use heuristics over more
complex optimization strategies.
Figure 1: Subjects’ view of Scenario 1a details, including
the candidates, utility and votes. Heuristic votes: Truthful:
[A,B,C,E], Take 1 Best: [E], Take 2 Best: [E,B], Take 3 Best:
[E,B,A]
4 METHODS
To begin, we identify specific scenarios that a voter may encounter
in approval voting (Section 4.1). For each scenario, we explore which
strategies people use, if theymaximize expected utility, and whether
people vote truthfully for all candidates with positive utility or use
some other approach.
Each scenario consists of a set of candidates C = {c1, ..., c5}
with i’s utility for each candidate in [−1.0, 0.25] We manipulate
two environmental features, including the number of winners (k =
1, 2, 3) and the number of missing votes (n = 0, 1, 3). When the final
ballots result in a tie, the winner(s) are chosen randomly.
For each scenario, the maximum expected utility can change for
different numbers of winners and missing votes. We calculate the
expected utility by generating the power set of all possible votes
that i could cast over C , i.e. V = P(C ).
The expected utility is then calculated for each of i’s votes in V
for every combination of k winners, and n remaining voters.
E[u(v,k)] = p1ui (c1) + ... + pmui (cm )
∀v ∈ V , 0 < k < 3, 0 < m < 5
Here,pj refers to the probability that candidate c j is in the current
profile. For all combinations of numbers of winners and missing
votes, we calculate the expected utility for each heuristic, the maxi-
mum expected utility, and any votes in V not represented by the
heuristics that maximized i’s expected utility.
This calculation shows how the computation of an expected
utility maximizing strategy is a cognitively demanding option to
which heuristics can be low effort alternatives.
4.1 Scenarios
Below we detail the candidates, utilities, the number of current
votes, and the number of missing votes (if applicable) for each
candidate for several partial profiles, which we designed to study
specific behaviors as the number of winners (k) and the number
of missing votes (n) change. The scenarios were presented as de-
picted in Figure 1 along with a text description of how many voters
remained to vote. When applicable we also show the heuristic strat-
egy that would lead to the maximum expected utility, which we
would expect each participant to employ when presented with a
particular voting scenario.
# winners (k)
n 1 2 3
0 0.12Take 1
0.22
Take 1
0.31
Take 2
1 0.11Take 1
0.21
Take 2
0.30
Take 2
3 0.11Take 1
0.20
Take 2
0.29
Take 2
Table 1: Scenario 1a: Maximum expected utility and the vot-
ing strategies that achieve it. n represents the number of
missing votes.
4.1.1 Scenario 1a: Candidate with Trivial Utility. This scenario
(Fig. 1, Table 1) represents a situationwhere a non-leading candidate
generates a trivial amount of utility if elected.
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Candidate: A B C D E
Utility: 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.25 0
# Votes: 3 3 4 3 3
Table 2: Scenario 1b details, including candidates, utilities
and votes. Heuristic votes: Truthful: [A,B,C,D], Take 1 Best:
[D], Take 2 Best: [D,B], Take 3 Best: [D,B,A]
# winners (k)
n 1 2 3
0 0.13Take 1
0.26
Take 1
0.36
Take 2
1 0.12Take 1
0.22
Take 2
0.31
Take 2
3 0.11Take 1
0.21
Take 2
0.29
Take 2
Table 3: Scenario 1b: Maximum expected utility and voting
strategies that achieve it.n represents the number ofmissing
votes.
4.1.2 Scenario 1b: Leader with Trivial Utility. This scenario (Ta-
bles 2,3) examines a situation where a leading candidate will gener-
ate a trivial amount of utility of elected.
Candidate: A B C D E
Utility: 0.05 0.10 0 0 0.25
# Votes: 1 1 4 4 1
Table 4: Scenario 2a details, including candidates, utilities
and votes. Heuristic votes: Truthful: [A,B,E], Take 2 Best:
[E,B], Take 1 Best: [E]
# winners (k)
n 1 2
0 – –
1 – –
3 0.01Truth
0.04
Truth
Table 5: Scenario 2a: Maximum expected utility and voting
strategy that achieve it. n represents the number of miss-
ing votes. When n = 0 and n = 1, it is impossible to elect
a preferred candidate, and all voting strategies lead to an ex-
pected utility of 0.
4.1.3 Scenario 2a: Dominated for One and Two Winners. This
scenario (Tables 4, 5) examines a situation where neutral candidates
dominate the preferred candidates. When only 1 or 2 candidates
can win, there is no possibility of electing a preferred candidate,
except when there are 3 missing votes.
Candidate: A B C D E
Utility: 0.10 0 0 0 0.25
# Votes: 1 4 4 4 1
Table 6: Scenario 2b details, including candidates, utilities
and votes. Heuristic votes: Truthful: [A,E], Take 1 Best: [E]
# winners (k)
n 3
0 –
1 –
3 0.05Truth
Table 7: Scenario 2b: Maximum expected utility and voting
strategy that achieve it. n represents the number of missing
votes. It is impossible to elect a preferred candidate for n = 0
and n = 1.
4.1.4 Scenario 2b: Dominated for Three Winners. Like Scenario
2a, this scenario (Tables 6,7) examines a situation where neutral
candidates dominate the preferred candidates. In this particular
scenario there is no possibility of electing a preferred candidate in
the 3-winner case. See Table 6 and Table 7 for scenario details.
Candidate: A B C D E
Utility: 0.05 0.10 0 -1.00 0.25
# Votes: 3 3 4 4 4
Table 8: Scenario 3 details, including candidates, utilities
and votes.Heuristic votes: Truthful: [A,B,E], Take 1 Best: [E],
Take 2 Best: [E,B], Regret Minimization: [A,B,C,E]
# winners (k)
n 1 2 3
0 0.25
Truth,
Take 1,
Take 2
0.25
Regret,
[C,E]
-0.03
Regret
1 0.10
Regret.
0.06
Regret
-0.10
Regret
3 0.03
Regret
-0.03
Regret
-0.17
Regret
Table 9: Scenario 3: Maximum expected utility and the vot-
ing strategies that achieve it. n represents the number of
missing votes. [C,E] represents a vote that maximizes ex-
pected utility, but does not fall into one of our defined
heuristics.
4.1.5 Scenario 3: Disliked Candidate. This scenario (Tables 8,9)
examines a situation where a candidate will generate negative
utility if elected, representing a situation where the voter i dislikes
the candidate.
Candidate: A B C D E
Utility: 0.10 0 0.15 0.20 0
# Votes: 3 4 3 3 3
Table 10: Scenario 4 details, including candidates, utilities
and votes.Heuristic votes:Truthful: [A,C,D], Take 1Best: [D],
Take 2 Best: [C,D]
4.1.6 Scenario 4: Neutral Leader. This scenario (Tables 10,11)
examines a situation where a neutral candidate is leading the elec-
tion.
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# winners (k)
n 1 2 3
0 0.11Truth
0.23
Truth
0.32
Take 2
1 0.11Truth
0.22
Take 2
0.31
Truth
3 0.11Take 2
0.21
Truth
0.31
Truth
Table 11: Scenario 4: Maximum expected utility and voting
strategies that achieve it.n represents the number ofmissing
votes.
4.2 Experiment Implementation
Participants. 104 participants were recruited through Mechanical
Turk to participate in the voting heuristics study. Participants were
paid $1.00 to complete the survey. They also received a bonus of
no more than $8.00 that was determined by the outcome of the
hypothetical elections.
Procedure. In the study, participants were asked to vote in a
series of unrelated hypothetical elections. All participants voted
in the single winner scenarios (n=104). Participants were then ran-
domly assigned to be part of a 2-winner (n=50) or 3-winner(n=54)
election for the remainder of the study.
Participants were asked to give informed consent and then pro-
ceeded to study. They read instructions which explained approval
voting and the tie-breaking mechanism with examples. After read-
ing the instructions, they proceeded through single-winner scenar-
ios, first encountering scenarios with 0 missing votes, then 1 and
finally, 3 missing votes. From there, the survey presented each par-
ticipant with a series of multi-winner scenarios for their assigned
group (2 or 3-winner), in order of increasing uncertainty.
Each election displayed an image showing the candidates, the
number of votes cast for each candidate so far, and how much
money the participant would earn for each candidate if they were
elected. Figure 1 is an example of what the participants saw.
When voting, subjects could vote for 0 or more (up to five) of the
five candidates. After voting, they would see the election results,
including the winners, the amount earned, and the ballots cast by
any missing voters (when applicable).
The experiment was designed so that participants could choose
to vote truthfully (for all candidates with positive utility) or manip-
ulate their vote to achieve a higher utility. We expected that most
people would try to vote strategically, but since the situations in-
volve varying degrees of uncertainty and were cognitively complex,
participants would not perform all of the necessary computations
to identify the strategy that maximizes their utility. Instead, we
expected that people would use heuristics, such as being truthful or
using take the X best, to prioritize the highest priority candidates.
5 RESULTS & DISCUSSION
The results of the behavioral experiment described above showed
unique patterns of behavior in each scenario, particularly across
the different conditions. The next few sections describe the results
for each scenario.
Figure 2: Scenario 1a Results. Maximizing strategies are
marked with a star.
5.1 Scenarios 1a, 1b: Trivial Utilities
In these scenarios, we wanted to see whether or not people would
vote for a candidate with a trivial utility (represented as a candidate
that would earn 1¢ if elected). Scenario 1a examined the case when
the trivial candidate was not leading the election and Scenario 1b
examined when it was. We found that in both scenarios, people
generally did not vote truthfully for all candidates with positive
utility, including the trivial candidate. In Scenario 1a, only 15.4%
voted truthfully in the 1-winner election, 16.0% in the 2-winner
election, and 9.9% in the 3-winner election. Scenario 1b was similar
with only 14.7% voting truthfully in the 1-winner election, 11.3% in
the 2-winner election and 8.0% in the 3-winner election.
In both of these scenarios, it was optimal to use a take the X best
approach, with X increasing as the number of winners and missing
votes increased (see Tables 1 and 3). Although themajority of people
used a take the X best strategy (Scenario 1a: 77.8%, Scenario 1b:
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Figure 3: Scenario 1b Results. Maximizing strategies are
marked with a star.
78.8%), they rarely prioritized theX candidates that wouldmaximize
the expected utility. In Scenario 1a, only 21.5% of participants chose
a strategy that would lead to an optimal outcome. In Scenario 1b,
only 18.4% chose a maximizing strategy.
Using χ2 analysis, we found no significant difference in how
people voted as the number of missing votes increased, even in the
2-winner elections where increased uncertainty led to a different
maximizing strategy (take the 1 best for 0 missing votes vs. take
the 2 best for 3 missing votes). However, significant differences (P
< 0.005) were found when comparing the voting strategies used
by those electing one or two winners compared to those electing
three winners. In general, when voting in the 1-winner and 2-
winner elections, participants voted for 2 or 3 candidates (1-winner:
57.9%, 2-winner: 70.7%) more often than other strategies. When
participants voted in the 3-winner election, they usually voted for
3 candidates (61.7%) (see Figures 2 and 3).
5.2 Scenarios 2a, 2b: Dominated Preferences
In these scenarios, we wanted to see if people would vote truthfully
when neutral candidates dominated their preferred candidates. Sce-
nario 2a examined this in the context of 1 and 2-winner elections,
where Scenario 3a looked at 3-winner contexts. In both Scenario
2a and 2b it was possible to elect a preferred candidate when there
were 3 missing votes, where the maximizing strategy was to vote
truthfully (see Tables 5 and 7). Voting truthfully was also the par-
ticipants’ dominant strategy no matter the numbers of winners or
missing votes (Scenario 2a: 44.2%, Scenario 2b: 62.3%). The second
most common strategy was to abstain (Scenario 2a: 16.5%, Scenario
2b: 20.4%).
Using χ2 analysis, we found a significant difference (P < 0.0005)
when comparing the voting strategies that people used in Scenario
2a when voting for one winner versus two winners. There was also
a significant difference in voting strategies when when there was 0
or 1 missing vote, compared to 3. When there were 0 missing votes,
participants chose to abstain 22.7%, but when there were 3 missing
votes, only 2.6% of participants abstained. This seems to indicate
that voters in Scenario 2a recognized that they had a small chance
to elect a preferred candidate in the 3-winner condition and voted
accordingly. In Scenario 2b, the number of abstentions decreased as
the level of uncertainty increased (0 missing votes: 25.9% abstain, 3
missing votes: 14.8% abstain), but it was not enough to result in a
significant difference in each groups’ voting strategies.
5.3 Scenario 3: Disliked Candidate
In this scenario, we explored how people would vote in the pres-
ence of a disliked candidate that would generate negative utility
if elected. Here, regret minimization was a maximizing strategy
for most combinations of numbers of winners and missing votes.
However, in the single-winner election with 0 missing votes, it was
possible to achieve the optimal strategy both by being truthful or
using take the X best. When one vote was missing in the single
winner election, it was best to be truthful. Voting [C,E], a strategy
that did not align with any of the heuristics defined in this paper,
was also a maximizing strategy in the 2-winner scenario with 0
missing votes.
This scenario was interesting as people’s voting strategy changed
significantly (P < 0.005) when comparing the strategies used by
those voting in 1-winner elections with 0 or 1 missing votes, to
those voting in elections missing 3 votes. In all three single winner
groups, more people responded with a truthful (0 missing votes:
29.8%, 1 missing votes: 36.5%, 3 missing votes: 30.8%) or take the
1 best strategy (0 missing votes: 46.1%, 1 missing votes: 35.6%, 3
missing votes: 23.1%), than any other strategy. However, the number
of voters using regret minimization (0 missing votes: 5.8%, 1 missing
votes: 4.8% and 3 missing votes: 17.3%) increased so that it was the
3rd most popular strategy when 3 voters were missing.
The responses to the 2-winner election were more variable, with
maximizing strategies being more popular than other strategies (0
missing votes: 38.0%, 1 missing vote: 48.0%, 3 missing votes: 50.0%),
but still not used by a majority of the candidates. In the 3-winner
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election, being truthful was the most popular response, whereas
the optimal strategy (regret minimization) was used only 20.4% of
the time.
In general, it was common for participants in this scenario to
vote for as many candidates as there were winners in the election.
When voting in the 1-winner election, participants voted for one
candidate 37.9% of the time. In the 2-winner election, voting for
two candidates was also the most common (40.0%), and participants
in the 3-winner election mostly voted for three candidates (53.7%).
5.4 Scenario 4: Neutral Leading Candidate
In this scenario, tested if people would vote truthfully when a
neutral candidate is leading, even in situations when take the 2 best
was the maximizing strategy, e.g., when there is 1 winner with 3
missing votes, or 3 winners with 0 missing votes. For this scenario,
participants voted in single winner elections with 0, 1 or 3 missing
votes, and in 1- 2- or 3-winner elections with 0 missing votes.
We found that when there were 0 missing votes, people’s strate-
gies changed significantly (P < 0.005) depending on the number
of winners in the election. Overall, being truthful dominated the
other strategies (1-winner:49.7%, 2-winner: 56%, 3-winner: 81.5%),
especially in the 3-winner election, even though it would have been
better to use take the 2 best in this instance. In fact, take the 2 best
represented only 9.2% of votes in the 3-winner election. There was
no significant difference in people’s strategies as the number of
missing votes increased. Being truthful was the dominant strategy,
even in the 3-winner election, where using take the 2 best had a
higher expected utility (0 missing votes: 44.2%, 1 missing votes:
47.1%, 3 missing votes: 57.7%) (see Figure 4).
5.5 General Discussion
Behavioral results showed some distinct patterns of voting across all
scenarios. The majority of participants did not vote using a strategy
that maximized expected utility, especially in the 1-winner (25.6%)
and 2-winner (38.4%) conditions. In the 3-winner condition, 49.6%
voted using amaximizing strategy.We also found that as the number
of possible winners increased, participants were more likely to vote
truthfully, i.e., for all candidates with positive utility (1-winner:
33.6%, 2-winner: 33.6%, 3-winner: 46.1%). We also found that when
participants were not entirely truthful, they still tended to use a
take the X best heuristic, and this captured a significant portion of
their responses (1-winner: 50.6%, 2-winner: 43.8%, 3-winner: 34.4%).
We found that people generally used different heuristics in differ-
ent scenarios and as the numbers of winners changed. For example,
in Scenarios 1 (trivial utilities, see 5.1) and 3 (disliked candidate,
see 5.3), a significant portion of voters did not vote completely
truthfully, and chose to use another strategy such as take the X
best or regret minimization. Voters in these scenarios also tended
to vote for a number of candidates equal to the number of winners
they were electing, indicating that they were choosing a heuristic
that aligned with the number of winners. However, in Scenarios
2 (dominated preferences, see 5.2) and 4 (neutral leader, see 5.4),
being truthful was the dominant strategy by a wide margin, and
there was no relation between the number of candidates voted for
and the number of winners.
We found that people were not very sensitive to changes in
uncertainty. In Scenarios 1 and 4, participants’ behavior did not
significantly change as the number of missing votes increased, even
when this resulted in using a non-optimal strategy. In Scenario 2,
voters in the 2-winner elections were sensitive to the fact that they
had some chance of electing a candidate when there were 3 missing
votes, leading to fewer abstentions in that condition. In Scenario
3, some voters were able to identify that the underlying optimal
strategy changed, increasing the number of voters using regret
minimization from 5.8% when there were 0 missing votes to 17.3%
when there were 3 missing votes.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we study heuristics in the context of multi-winner
elections using approval voting. Our behavioral results show that
people do not vote completely truthfully in some approval voting
scenarios, such as when there was a candidate with trivial utility or
negative utility. In other situations, such as when neutral candidate
were leading, people tend to be completely truthful. When people
do not vote completely truthfully, they tend to vote sincerely, using
a take the X best heuristic and they generally are not very effective
at choosing the heuristic that maximized their utility. It would be
interesting to explore other scenarios in approval voting to see how
well these behaviors generalize to other situations.
While the results presented in this paper provide insights into the
use and effectiveness of certain heuristics in approval voting, there
are many other voting rules and heuristics. It would be interesting
to continue exploring heuristics under other voting rules, including
those that are known to be computationally complex to manipulate
with complete information, such as the single transferable vote
(STV). In decision science, taxonomies have been created to show
which heuristics may be more or less useful in which environment
[12]. We believe that a similar approach could prove beneficial
to our understanding of voting heuristics which is important for
factoring them into a more realistic analysis of the voting rules.
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